The Roots of Bioinformatics by Searls, David B.
Perspective
The Roots of Bioinformatics
David B. Searls*
Independent Consultant, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Introduction
Every new scientific discipline or meth-
odology reaches a point in its maturation
where it is fruitful for it to turn its gaze
inward, as well as backward. Such intro-
spection helps to clarify the essential
structure of a field of study, facilitating
communication, pedagogy, standardiza-
tion, and the like, while retrospection aids
this process by accounting for its begin-
nings and underpinnings.
In this spirit, PLoS Computational Biology is
launching a new series of themed articles
tracing the roots of bioinformatics. Essays
from prominent workers in the field will
relate how selected scientific, technologi-
cal, economic, and even cultural threads
came to influence the development of the
field we know today. These are not
intended to be review articles, nor person-
al reminiscences, but rather narratives
from individual perspectives about the
origins and foundations of bioinformatics,
and are expected to provide both historical
and technical insights. Ideally, these arti-
cles will offer an archival record of the
field’s development, as well as a human
face on an important segment of science,
for the benefit of current and future
workers.
Upcoming articles, already commis-
sioned, will cover the roots of bioinfor-
matics in structural biology, in evolution-
ary biology, and in artificial intelligence,
with more in the works. These topics are
obviously very broad, and so are likely to
be subdivided or otherwise revisited in
future installments by authors with varying
perspectives. Topics and authors will be
chosen at the discretion of the editors
along lines broadly corresponding to the
usual content of this journal.
The author, having been asked to serve
as Series Editor by the Editor-in-Chief,
will endeavor to maintain a uniform flow
of articles solicited from luminaries in the
field. As a starting point to the series, I
offer below a few vignettes and reflections
on some longer-term influences that have
shaped the discipline. I first consider the
unique status of bioinformatics vis-a `-vis
science and technology, and then explore
historical trends in biology and related
fields that anticipated and prepared the
way for bioinformatics. Examining the
context of key moments when computers
were first taken up by early adopters
reveals how deep the roots of bioinfor-
matics go.
The Nature of Bioinformatics
Many who draw a distinction between
bioinformatics and computational biology
portray the former as a tool kit and the
latter as science. All would allow that the
science informs the tools and the tools
enable the science; in any case, bioinfor-
matics and computational biology are near
enough cousins that their origins and early
influences are likely to be commingled as
well. Therefore, this article and series will
construe bioinformatics broadly, bearing
in mind it can thus be expected to have a
dual nature. This duality echoes another
that goes back to Aristotle, between
‘‘episteme’’ (knowledge, especially scientif-
ic) and ‘‘techne’’ (know-how, in the sense
of craft or technology). The power of
bioinformatics might be seen as arising
from their harmonious combination, in
the Greek tradition, lending it emergent
capabilities beyond the simple intersection
of computers and biology, or indeed of
science and engineering.
A Bioinformatics Revolution?
Many commentators refer to the
‘‘bioinformatics revolution.’’ If there has
been one, was it a revolution in techne,
like the Industrial Revolution, or in
episteme, like the Scientific Revolution?
Or was it both? The former suggests
quantum leaps in scale and capability
through automation, which seems to
apply to bioinformatics almost by defini-
tion, while the latter implies an actual
shift in worldview, raising a more philo-
sophical question.
In Thomas Kuhn’s famous conception
of scientific revolutions, the early stages
of paradigm formation are freewheeling
and unstructured, while being effectively
cut off from the pre-existing scientific
milieu by their very novelty and an
inherent incommensurability [1]. (The
overused word ‘‘paradigm’’ can be ex-
cused in this context because it was
Kuhn who instigated its overuse.) At
some point, such ‘‘pre-science’’ becomes
consolidated, establishes norms and
templates, and settles into a ‘‘normal
science’’ phase that allows for efficient
discovery within a prevailing paradigm.
Many would agree that the heady early
days of bioinformatics had a makeshift
feel, which has since matured into a
more coherent, productive discipline
with an established canon.
But before claiming the exalted status of
a Kuhnian paradigm shift, it should be
noted that Kuhn had in mind rather
broader disciplines of science than bioin-
formatics, which was erected within and in
relation to the comprehensive pre-existing
scaffoldings of biology and computer
science. To the extent that bioinformatics
is a subsidiary or derivative field, it might
call more for an evolutionary than a
revolutionary model of development, of a
sort some critics of Kuhn have advocated
[2,3]. From this perspective, its novelty
and force perhaps derive from hybrid
vigor rather than spontaneous generation,
and it would seem to be more enabling
than overturning—thus, primarily an ad-
vance in techne. Whether its rapid uptake
and substantial impact qualify it as a
technological revolution, or merely an
evolutionary saltation, is perhaps only a
matter of semantics.
In Kuhn’s semantics, though, scientific
revolutions produce profound shifts in our
literal perception of reality. A computa-
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attitudes toward data, or even models of
data, but it seems unlikely to fundamen-
tally alter our sense of reality in the
domain of biology. Still, true believers
may argue that the ‘‘computational think-
ing’’ movement [4] as applied to biology,
and perhaps even a view of life itself as a
form of computation [5], does indeed rise
to the level of a paradigm shift and a true
revolution in episteme. We will explore a
few such ideas below.
The Role of Tools
A philosophical stance called realism
essentially views episteme as independent
of techne, holding that scientific truth is
ultimately separable from how we measure
or model it. But some assign tools a more
prominent and persistent role. The Nobel
laureate physicist P. W. Bridgman’s influ-
ential notions of operationalism sought to
reduce all scientific concepts to the literal
means by which they are measured—that
is, to operational definitions to be taken at
face value rather than as describing some
underlying idealization—so as not to over
interpret or heedlessly conflate such con-
cepts [6]. Thus, temperature would be
defined in terms of thermometers rather
than thermodynamics. Decades before
computer scientists conceived of opera-
tional semantics and abstract data types,
Bridgman considered a scientific concept
‘‘synonymous with the corresponding set
of operations’’ [7]. Though controversial
in physics circles, operationalization was
seized upon by certain ‘‘soft’’ sciences like
sociology as a way of achieving a more
respectable exactitude.
The ‘‘hardening’’ of biology in the 20th
century involved a reductionist conver-
gence with chemistry and physics, en-
hanced by improving instrumentation, as
well as new quantitative overlays to the
legacies of Linneaus, Mendel, and Darwin.
This often called for operationalizations,
such as that of ‘‘enzyme’’ in terms of a
measured activity, or that of the much-
debated concept of ‘‘species’’ [3]. The
practice predated but has lately been
reinforced by bioinformatics. Computers,
with their notorious literal-mindedness,
require the same sort of ‘‘tightening up’’
of descriptive language as that urged by
Bridgman [6], and have promoted ever
more explicitly operational definitions, for
example, of ‘‘gene’’, in terms of the
biological operations applied to DNA
sequences [8].
Bridgman felt that by first recognizing
clearly the distinction between operation-
ally defined concepts such as gravitational
and inertial mass, deeper insights like
Einstein’s equivalence principle would
come more naturally. Today, operational
definitions of biological concepts such as
‘‘gene’’ and ‘‘pathway’’, distinguished as to
whether they are probed by methods
genetic, biochemical, or biophysical, are
providing new insights as they are similarly
integrated, with appropriate caution, by
bioinformatic methods.
The Instrumental Gene
Even scientific theories can be consid-
ered techne. Instrumentalism, an idea that
goes back to the earliest days of the
scientific revolution, takes a very pragmat-
ic, almost mechanical view of theories,
that they should be viewed merely as tools
for predicting or explaining observations
as opposed to directly describing objective
reality [9]. Thus genetics was at first
purely instrumental; regardless of any
conviction that the gene had a physical
basis, it was in practice a conceptual tool
[10]. Instrumentalism doesn’t ask whether
a theory is true or false, but treats it as a
sort of anonymous function taking data as
input and producing predictions or expla-
nations as output, the quality of which
determine the appeal of the theory.
Whether or not this is an adequate
formulation of a scientific theory, it may
be as good a definition as any of a
bioinformatics application.
For a taste of the pre-molecular instru-
mental conception of genes, consider the
moment in 1911 when Alfred Sturtevant
made a key contribution. While still an
undergraduate at Columbia University, he
won a seat in the legendary ‘‘fly room’’ of
T. H. Morgan’s lab, which was busy
identifying Drosophila mutants and count-
ing offspring of various crosses. One day,
upon realizing that multiple pairwise
linkage strengths could not only be viewed
inversely as distances but also collapsed
onto a single dimension, he related that he
‘‘went home and spent most of the night
(to the neglect of my undergraduate
homework) in producing the first chromo-
some map’’ [11]. Long before the advent
of bioinformatics, we nevertheless glimpse
something of its ‘‘style’’ in this approach to
data transformation, integration, and vi-
sualization—not to mention the fact that
the youngest scientists often seem most
adept at data-crunching (evidently even
without benefit of a computer literacy
surpassing that of their elders).
Bioinformatics and Genes
The gene concept has undergone a
steady evolution, in varying degrees in-
strumental and operational [12,13]. The
work of Barbara McClintock, for example,
did much to ground the instrumental gene
in physical locations on chromosomes by
1929 (though soon she in turn introduced
instrumental notions of transposition and
‘‘controlling elements’’ that only became
instantiated decades later in transposons,
operons, and other regulatory apparatus,
resulting in her belated Nobel Prize in
1983 [14]). Bioinformatics has played an
increasingly important role in this evolu-
tion. Mark Gerstein notes that by the
1970s and 1980s, through a combination
of cloning and sequencing techniques and
then computational gene identification
(whether by similarity or protein-coding
signature), the working definition of a gene
was reduced to a literal open reading
frame of sequence—digitized data, in
other words, critically dependent on elec-
tronic storage and algorithms—and that
by the 1990s the gene had become for
most practical purposes an annotated
database entry [13]. Gerstein goes on to
assert that the latest metaphor for genes is
as ‘‘subroutines in the genomic operating
system,’’ which suggests entirely new
senses of operationalism and instrumen-
talism in biology, with a natural role for
bioinformatics.
Yet operationalism and instrumentalism
are often challenged in philosophical
circles today, where they are considered
to be ‘‘anti-realist’’ in their seeming
disregard for the actual physical objects
and processes underlying scientific con-
cepts. In fact, it would appear that
scientific progress is made when opera-
tional concepts are joined up, as by
Einstein, or when instrumental concepts
are mapped to successively more material
forms, as by Sturtevant, McClintock, and
eventually James Watson and Francis
Crick. But this only bears out the func-
tional utility of these ‘‘isms,’’ whose
persistence suggests some underlying
truth; they seem to wrestle with important
concepts such as abstraction and reifica-
tion (that is, concretization of abstractions
as ‘‘first-class objects’’ for further manip-
ulation) that are natural to and even
promoted by the computational sciences.
One thing they certainly assert is that it is
a mistake to trivialize the role of tools in
science as mere means to an end, as
scientific ground truth may be hard to




Bioinformatics is far from being the first
discipline to straddle the duality of epis-
teme and techne. Mathematics is also
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here it is even more apparent how
inseparable is the tool from the underlying
scientific reality. Indeed, since Galileo and
Newton, a common sentiment has been
that science is never so successful as when
its laws and explanations can be reduced
to mathematical expression. Historically
this had not been biology’s forte, but early
in the 20th century statistics and numer-
ical analysis began to establish footholds in
the field. Computers eventually carried
these methods to new heights, though
mainly by automating them rather than
changing their underlying methodologies.
Yet ‘‘pure’’ computer science is itself
discrete math, separable from hardware,
and soon this also would come to bear on
a newly digital biology. As the following
narrative suggests, the roots of bioinfor-
matics may be detected in a mathemati-
zation of biology on many fronts, which
machines only served to accelerate. The
middle of the 20th century witnessed the
key transitions.
Mathematics Sets the Scene
The development of modern statistics
was to a significant degree driven by its
application to biology in the work of
Francis Galton in the 19th century [15]
and R. A. Fisher in the 20th [16]. Fisher
helped put both Mendelism and Darwin-
ism on a firm mathematical footing by
1930, and he is also credited with being
the first to apply a computer to biology,
albeit almost offhandedly. In a 1950 note
giving tables of solutions to a differential
equation developed for population genet-
ics, Fisher says simply ‘‘I owe this
tabulation to Dr. M.V. Wilkes and Mr.
D.J. Wheeler, operating the EDSAC
electronic computer.’’ [17] EDSAC, the
Electronic Delay Storage Automatic Cal-
culator, was built at the University of
Cambridge Mathematical Laboratory; it is
considered the first truly practical stored-
program computer and the inspiration for
the first text on computer programming in
1951 [18].
As biology became more quantitative
throughout the 20th century, it increas-
ingly assumed a ‘‘statistical frame of mind’’
[19]. In addition, naturalists adopted
numerical methods for population model-
ing, and biochemists for enzyme kinetics;
such applications remain the core topics of
mathematical biology texts today. As
noted, statistics and numerical analysis
were considerably empowered by comput-
ers, but later these disciplines in turn
contributed substantially to entirely new
methods such as machine learning and
multiscale mathematical modeling that are
now central elements of bioinformatics.
Today’s systems biology has a pedigree
extending back at least to the first half of
the 20th century. The biologist Ludwig
von Bertalanffy began work on his holistic
General System Theory then [20], while
Norbert Wiener’s cybernetics added an
engineering math perspective in the 1950s
encompassing feedback and regulatory
systems that was influenced not only by
early computer science, but also by
evolutionary biology and cognitive science
[21]. Network theory is often attributed to
Gestalt social psychologists in the 1930s,
but was productively merged with math-
ematical graph theory by 1956 [22].
Developmental biology began a long
flirtation with math upon the publication
in 1917 of D’Arcy Thompson’s On
Growth and Form, which was technically
elegant and visually striking, albeit mostly
descriptive [23]. Computing pioneer Alan
Turing turned to biology during the tragic
denouement of his life and was responsible
in 1952 for a classic work in spatial
modeling of morphogenesis [24], propos-
ing a reaction-diffusion model of pattern
formation that has only recently gained
strong experimental support [25]. In this
period Turing used the Manchester Uni-
versity Mark I, another trailblazing stored-
program machine, to model biological
growth in systems such as the Fibonacci
patterns in fir cones described by D’Arcy
Thompson [26]. Turing’s labors on these
problems are evident in page after page of
calculations interspersed with dense ma-
chine code subroutines set down in his
own hand, now archived at King’s Col-
lege, Cambridge [27].
Turing’s Legacy
Turing’s bequest to biology is far more
sweeping, though, insofar as bioinfor-
matics would eventually embody a broad
computational mathematization of the life
sciences. The changes would be not only
quantitative but also qualitative. As Fisher
realized, ‘‘conventional’’ applications of
numerical analysis could be taken to new
levels, visualized as never before, and often
freed from the necessity of closed-form
solutions, by the sheer power of comput-
ers. But qualitatively, Turing’s first efforts
at biological computing began to shift the
focus from the equations to the phenom-
ena, from calculation to modeling. More-
over, Turing’s overall legacy would soon
foster a new perspective founded in
discrete math, information theory, and
symbolic reasoning, catalyzing trends that
may already have been inchoate in the
new molecular biology.
It is interesting to speculate whether
Turing’s turn toward biology, had he lived
much past the discovery of the double
helix, would have caused him to recognize
and embrace this pivotal moment when
biology became digital. He could not have
failed to remark (as others soon would
[28,29]) how biological macromolecules
incarnated his virtual automata, with
biopolymers for tapes and enzymes to
read and write them. Moreover, as a
veteran of Bletchley Park and the wartime
cryptanalysis effort, he might well have
been drawn into the frenzy to decipher the
genetic code that played out in the decade
after his death.
In 1943 Turing had visited the US to
share British codebreaking methods and
met often with Claude Shannon, who was
working on similar problems at Bell Labs
[30]. Shannon’s efforts on cryptanalysis
were closely tied to his work in commu-
nication that, within the decade, would
give rise to the new field of information
theory. Turing took the opportunity to
show him his 1936 paper on the Universal
Turing Machine, since Shannon had been
responsible in 1937 for the first rigorous
application of Boolean logic as a formal
basis for digital design, which to that point
had comprised much more ad hoc ar-
rangements of circuit elements. This
contribution, which constituted Shannon’s
Master’s thesis, is accorded great signifi-
cance in the history of computing, but
what has been all but forgotten is his 1940
PhD thesis, entitled ‘‘An Algebra for
Theoretical Genetics’’ [31]. In this work,
Shannon formalized population genetics
just as he had circuit design, after spending
an instructive summer at the Cold Spring
Harbor Laboratory. Today it would be
labeled bioinformatics.
One is left to wonder whether Turing
and Shannon ever touched on biology
during their lunchtime discussions. The
geneticist James Crow feels that Shannon
might well have extended his PhD work to
have significant impact in the field but for
the fact that he was drawn irresistibly to
communication theory, first by the war
and then by the lush technical milieu of
Bell Labs [32]. It is intriguing to think that
two giants of computer science and
mathematics may have come so close to
committing their careers to biology.
Enter the Physicists
Instead it was physicists, some of them
veterans of the Manhattan Project, who
migrated to the new molecular biology
and helped imbue it with their mathemat-
ical sensibilities. The attraction can be
discerned in Erwin Shro ¨dinger’s famous
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Life? [33], which influenced Francis Crick
and in turn was stimulated by the work of
physicist-turned-biologist Max Delbru ¨ck,
mentor to James Watson. In this slim
volume, Shro ¨dinger posits that chromo-
somes constitute Morse-like ‘‘code-scripts’’
of which ‘‘the all-penetrating mind, once
conceived by Laplace, to which every
causal connection lay immediately open,
could tell from their structure whether the
egg would develop … into a black cock or
a speckled hen …’’ (pp. 20–21). Later, he
suggests that some such executive in fact
resides in the chromosomes themselves—
that they are not only script but also
machinery. This programmatic conceit, in
itself strikingly evocative of Turing’s self-
referential automata and associated
proofs, foretold the scramble to solve the
puzzle of how the DNA sequence mapped
to the other structures of life.
One of the first responses Watson and
Crick had to their seminal 1953 paper was
a letter from the physicist George Gamow,
unknown to them, who 5 years before had
proposed the Big Bang [34]. Gamow was
already fascinated by biology, being
friends with Delbru ¨ck and having pub-
lished a popularization of a broad swath of
science entitled One Two Three…Infinity,
which included an exposition of fly
genetics showing Morgan and Sturtevant’s
map [35]. Gamow’s remarkable letter
reimagined the DNA in each chromosome
as a long number written in base four, so
as to open up its analysis to number
theory. He was soon calling this ‘‘the
number of the beast,’’ suggesting that it
varied only slightly among individuals,
‘‘whereas the numbers representing the
members of two different species must
show larger differences’’ [36]. Not only did
Gamow thus neatly frame the future of
sequence bioinformatics, but he went on
to pose the question of the genetic code for
the first time in purely formal terms—that
is, in Crick’s words, ‘‘not cluttered up with
a lot of unnecessary chemical details’’
(quoted by Judson [30]). Postulating a
collinearity of DNA with proteins (having
seen Sanger’s as yet fragmentary insulin
sequences), the question for Gamow was
how to ‘‘translate’’ the four-letter code to a
20-letter code.
Crick credited him with the simple
combinatoric analysis that triplets of
DNA bases would suffice [37], but Ga-
mow seems almost to have recoiled from
the prodigal degeneracy implied by the
leftover information content (i.e., 4
3 trip-
lets for only 20 amino acids). Certainly
Gamow’s first model was overly compli-
cated, involving as it did an overlapping
and thereby non-degenerate code, as well
as attempting to account for a direct
translation from the DNA helix to the
polypeptide by a physical docking [38].
(This perhaps reflects Shro ¨dinger’s errant
instinct that chromosomes should be self-
sufficient machines, or just enthusiasm for
the astonishing implications of base pair-
ing in the Watson-Crick model.) Still,
Gamow set the game in motion, and
served with great verve as its master of
ceremonies.
Codebreaking
A letter written in 1954 by Gamow to
the biologist Martynas Ycas, preserved in
the Library of Congress complete with
marginal scrawls and cartoon drawings,
suggests the tenor of the times: ‘‘After the
collapse of triplet (major+2 minors) system
a new suggestion was made by Edward
Teller busy as he was with H bomb, and
Oppenheimer. The idea is that each
following aa. is defined by two bases …
and the preceeding AA. Looks good! The
‘preceeding AA’ is characterized only by
beeing [sic] ‘small’, ‘medium’ or ‘large.’
Last week I have discovered in Los Alamos
the possibility of putting that system on
Maniac, and this seems to be possible’’
[39].
What is most significant here is not the
next ill-conceived model to which Gamow
had turned, but rather the reference to
MANIAC I, the Mathematical Analyzer,
Numerical Integrator and Computer built
to do weapons research by Nicholas
Metropolis (of Monte Carlo fame) [40].
Once it was known that RNA directed
protein synthesis, Gamow and Ycas did
indeed use MANIAC to run a series of
Monte Carlo simulations, first trying in
1954 to salvage overlapping codes, and
when those proved untenable, testing in
1955 whether observed amino acid fre-
quencies in proteins were likely to arise
from non-overlapping triplet code transla-
tions [41]. (Metropolis also worked with
others soon afterwards to computationally
model cell multiplication and tumor cell
populations [42,43].)
These first MANIAC runs, requiring
hundreds of hours, represent a new
bioinformatics milestone, extending Tur-
ing’s mathematical modeling of outward
phenotypic patterns to stochastic modeling
of the informational mechanics of life. As
Lily Kay remarks, by ‘‘blurring the
boundary between theory, experiment,
and simulation … MANIAC had become
the site of an artificial reality’’ [44].
Among the many scientists whom Gamow
induced to take a run at the genetic code
was Herbert Simon, who dabbled in this at
the very moment he was beginning to
apply computers to general problem-
solving [44]. Simon would soon co-found
the discipline of artificial intelligence,
another fundament of bioinformatics,
and another field deeply indebted to
Turing. Gamow also recruited Robert
Ledley, who in 1955 wrote a theoretical
paper suggesting how computerized sym-
bolic reasoning could apply not only to the
genetic code but also to enzymatic path-
ways, portending modern pathway infer-
ence techniques [45]. Ledley went on
to promote computer-based medical diag-
nosis and protein sequence tools and
databases.
The Urge to Model
The non-overlapping code Gamow and
Ycas had arrived at by 1955 made an odd
assumption, that the order of bases in each
triplet was irrelevant. No doubt this was
again motivated by a desire to dispose of
degeneracy, as this scheme effectively did
by collapsing permutation classes, but in
some degree it may simply reflect the
surrounding upheaval: biology was be-
coming an information science even as
information science itself was aborning.
After all, for the first half of the 20th
century the prevailing mindset had been
that DNA comprised repeating identical
tetranucleotides, and that proteins were
amorphous with no set linear sequence
[46]. In his first letter to Watson and
Crick, Gamow even suggested that genes
were not localized, but smeared over the
chromosome like a Fourier transform [34],
his physicist’s instincts flying in the face of
all genetics since Morgan and Sturtevant.
Gamow’s biochemistry was initially just as
naı ¨ve. He had scant basis to assume that
exactly 20 amino acids were encoded,
since others were known to occur natural-
ly, if more rarely, and his first list of 20
actually included some of these and
omitted valid ones [37]. Gamow’s quanti-
tative skills and fresh perspective were
valuable and he learned quickly (much like
computer scientists who came to biology
later), but his concerted campaign to
deduce the transcriptional and translation-
al machinery on theoretical grounds seems
a bit feverish in retrospect.
Even Crick was not immune, proposing
a so-called ‘‘comma-free’’ code that uti-
lized relatively few triplets as codons, but
artfully chosen such that only one reading
frame would be possible [47]. By chance,
the math dictated that the capacity of such
an unambiguous comma-free triplet code
would be exactly 20 codons, making the
theory immensely appealing—and dead
wrong in the event. However, comma-free
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assumed great importance in computer
science by way of Shannon’s information
theory, which strove to quantify, charac-
terize, and ultimately ascribe utility to the
very sort of degeneracy with which
Gamow was contending [48]. While these
theoretical excursions of Gamow and
Crick foreshadow the future importance
of Turing and Shannon to bioinformatics,
they also exemplify how beautiful math,
much less numerology, can run afoul of
biological reality. Nowadays it is a truism
that the bioinformatics should not get too
far ahead of the data, yet we see that the
instrumentalist urge to model is nothing
new.
In fact, no amount of computational
modeling or theory could by itself have
discerned the full details of the genetic
code, which by the early 1960s fell to
bench scientists like the late Marshall
Nirenberg to elucidate by means of cell-
free translation systems and radioactive
tracers. The US National Institutes of
Health maintains in its archives pages
from Nirenberg’s lab notebooks, which
include sprawling spreadsheet-like tables
of hand-entered data, with multiple panels
taped together and chaotically annotated
[49]. It appears that he was literally
drawing conclusions directly on the data
sheets, outlining in red pencil the signifi-
cant entries (as indeed might a cryptogra-
pher), such that the genetic code is seen
emerging pictorially from the raw data.
One senses that the carefully arrayed rows
and columns of data, constituting an
exhaustive all-against-all probe of triplet
codes versus amino acids, was a harbinger
of something new in biology; if it were
done today, someone would no doubt
label it the ‘‘codome.’’
Codifying Biology
Gamow’s theoretical instincts were very
much in the mold of Delbru ¨ck who, in his
Nobel-winning 1943 paper with Salvador
Luria, confirmed the basic tenets of
Darwinism in bacteria through a profound
interpretation of a trivial experiment [50];
to this end, they deployed reasoning that
anticipated by 40 years the stochastic
coalescent theory now prominent in pop-
ulation genetics and the analysis of poly-
morphism [51]. Physicists and statisticians
brought to the biological table a degree of
comfort with formalism, not only in math
but also in language and logic, that would
also typify computer science. A similar
esteem for logic and formalism was also
apparent earlier in the century in the
philosophical movement called logical
positivism, a major inspiration for Bridg-
man’s operationalism [6,9].
The logical positivists of the Vienna
Circle between the wars felt that the time
was ripe to reduce all of science (in fact all
knowledge) to a pure empiricism, by which
the only admissible statements would be
those verifiable by direct observation. In
the process they rejected all things meta-
physical, and in fact felt that their efforts
should go to serving science by following
in its wake and providing a ‘‘rational
reconstruction’’ of it in symbolic logic and
formalized language. This entailed a
strongly reductionist view of scientific
theories and concepts, and faith in what
Rudolf Carnap called the ‘‘Unity of
Science’’ [52].
Today, when we codify biology in
comprehensive formal ontologies, enforc-
ing the stringent terminological and rela-
tional definitions demanded by computa-
tional structures, we are following in the
footsteps of the Vienna Circle. We should
take heed, because logical positivism did
not survive the half-century. Among many
critics, W. V. O. Quine attacked its
reductionist tenets, holding that science is
more like what he called a ‘‘Web of Belief’’
than a neat logic diagram, with complex
interwoven structures creating mutually
supporting bits of evidence and theory
[53]. (One would be tempted to load it
into Cytoscape.) Quine’s views are more
compatible with probabilistic networks
and connectionism, and with the current
assertions by systems biologists that the 50-
year run of reductionism in molecular
biology has played itself out [54]. Luckily,
bioinformatics is adaptable.
Computing Structures
Crystallographers were early adopters
of computers in aid of their laborious
calculations of Fourier syntheses and the
like, beginning mainly with home-brew
analog computers, but by the late 1940s
gradually shifting to IBM punchcard
tabulators programmed via plugboards
(recognizable descendants of those used
for the 1890 census) [55]. The first
crystallographic applications of stored-
program computers were done on ED-
SAC [56] and the Manchester Mark II
[57] in 1952–1953. However, these were
used for inorganic structures. The first
application of computers to protein crys-
tallography, which some consider the real
forerunner of today’s bioinformatics, was
in fact for the first high-resolution struc-
ture, that of myoglobin, in 1958 [58].
By the 1960s, crystallographers were
enthusiastic users of burgeoning computer
technology, not just for the tedious core
calculations but for many related routines
as well; dozens of codes were written in the
new FORTRAN and ALGOL program-
ming languages, as opposed to being
‘‘hand-coded’’ at machine level [55]. This
activity extended to visualization, includ-
ing interactive molecular graphics first
done by Cyrus Levinthal at the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, using an
early time-sharing mainframe connected
to an oscilloscope display of a wireframe
model controlled by a prototypic trackball
[59]. Of this, Levinthal wrote in 1966: ‘‘It
is too early to evaluate the usefulness of the
man-computer combination in solving real
problems of molecular biology. It does
seem likely, however, that only with this
combination can the investigator use his
‘chemical insight’ in an effective way’’
[59].
Crystallographers went on to accumu-
late myriad structures and from these
gained many ‘‘chemical insights’’ into
life. Since the time of Sturtevant, genet-
icists as well had been doing mutant
screens and maps that were undertaken
n o tt ot e s th y p o t h e s e si nt h ef i r s ti n s t a n c e ,
but to gather grist for the mill of
hypothesis generation. We tend to think
of data-driven research as a recent
innovation, and of the genome, pro-
teome, and all the other ‘‘omes’’ as
concepts uniquely enabled by technology,
bioinformatics, and audacious scale. In-
deed, omics is sometimes criticized as
‘‘high-tech stamp collecting’’ [60], but
this could also have described Darwin’s
time on the Beagle. In fact, the ground-
work for omics was laid long ago, and
with it the data-rich, information-centric
modality that came into its own with
the advent of computers.
Computing Traits
The first electronic computation of
genetic linkage was performed by H. R.
Simpson at the Rothamsted Experimental
Station (where R. A. Fisher had created the
statistical theory of experimental design) in
1958, on an early room-sized business
model, the Elliott 401 [61]. However, as
noted above and in a recent history by A.
W. F. Edwards [62], this introduction of
computers to genetics was merely the
culmination of a continuous evolution from
Mendel, through Morgan and Sturtevant,
to Fisher and many other statisticians,
theorists, and experimentalists.
The intellectual heirs of Linnaeus and
Darwin were beginning to feel the influ-
ence of computing in this same period,
spearheaded by math. George Gaylord
Simpson, who perhaps most embodied the
‘‘modern synthesis’’ of paleontology, ge-
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the mathematics of population genetics
pioneered by Fisher could relate to the
fossil record [63], and brought a focus to
evolutionary rates that presaged the mo-
lecular clock hypothesis central to modern
phylogenetic reconstruction. Simpson had
in 1939 co-authored the first book on
quantitative methods in biology proper
[64], and went on to devise operational
metrics for ecologists to assess similarity of
habitats based on the range of taxa found
in them [65]. (Other statisticians provided
estimators for species diversity within
habitats [66], and ecologists were quick
to adapt Shannon entropy to this purpose
[67], as eventually would bioinformati-
cians for sequence motif analysis.) These
were hand calculations as long as the data
were limited to a few combinations, but
when similarity metrics were adapted by
others to classification of species based on
increasing numbers of traits, the problem
soon grew to become as onerous as had
been the crystallographers’ hand labors.
Computing Trees
A phenetic operationalization of taxon-
omy (i.e., clustering by overall similarity)
invited automation. In 1957, P. H. A.
Sneath first applied a computer to classi-
fying bacteria, using a relatively advanced
Elliott 405 [68]; for readers not so
equipped, he also showed how to simulate
the computations by superimposing pho-
tographic negatives on which the data
were encoded as transparent dots. The
next year he published a follow-up with
the wonderfully Tom Swiftian title ‘‘An
Electro-Taxonomic Survey of Bacteria’’
[69]. Then, in 1960 an IBM staff math-
ematician, Taffee Tanimoto, worked with
David Rogers of the New York Botanical
Garden to apply computers to plant
classification [70]. (Their similarity metric,
bearing Tanimoto’s name, is commonly
used today in cheminformatics to compare
compounds; in fact, by 1957 there had
already been amazingly advanced work
done on computational chemical structure
search by the National Bureau of Stan-
dards for the US Patent Office [71].)
Though the idea of quantifying relation-
ships went back to the previous century,
computers thus helped to precipitate the
new field of ‘‘numerical taxonomy’’ with
the appearance of the 1963 book of that
name by Sneath and Robert Sokal [72],
which also broached the idea of extending
numerical approaches to phylogeny.
As related by Joel Hagen [73], compu-
tational research in classification soon
came to be driven by biological systemat-
ics with its very large datasets of well-
studied characteristics, an existing classifi-
cation system for reference, and cladistic
methods with explicit rules and formal
logic for establishing evolutionary histories
(despite the tension between pheneticists
and cladists, which is still evident in
bioinformatics today). In return, comput-
ers had a prodigious effect on systematics,
shaping the mathematics used, promoting
formality of methods, and most impor-
tantly, enabling the molecular systematics
that was about to explode on the scene. In
a few short years, with the work of
Dayhoff, Fitch, and many others, protein
structures and evolutionary trees would
come together in a powerful synergy that
still informs much of bioinformatics.
Sneath later recollected that population
biologists proved open to numerical tax-
onomy (though Fisher, characteristically,
worried that it didn’t have an exact
statistical basis), while evolutionary biolo-
gists were at first more dubious [74].
Traditional taxonomists felt most threat-
ened of all; David Hull tells of a conten-
tious meeting where one indignantly
asked, ‘‘You mean to tell me that taxon-
omists can be replaced by computers?’’
and was answered, ‘‘No, some of you can
be replaced by an abacus’’ [3]. G. G.
Simpson himself was receptive but, realiz-
ing the tectonic shift that was at hand, was
almost wistful in addressing his colleagues
(quoted in [73]): ‘‘We may as well realize
that the day is upon us when for many of
our problems, taxonomic and otherwise,
freehand observation and rattling off
elementary statistics on desk calculators
will no longer suffice. The zoologist of the
future … often is going to have to work
with a mathematical statistician, a pro-
grammer, and a large computer. Some of
you may welcome this prospect, but others
may find it dreadful’’.
The Bioinformatic Synthesis
Despite Simpson’s ambivalence, the
most salient feature of the development of
bioinformatics has been its success as an
interdisciplinary enterprise. The combina-
tion of biology and computer science seems
increasingly to be syncretic rather than
eclectic—not simply one of juxtaposition
and coexistence, but a substantial merging
of systems with different worldviews, meth-
ods, and cultures. At an even more
fundamental level, beyond any disciplinary
boundaries, it represents a successful syn-
thesis of episteme and techne.
At first,itmay have appeared more like a
marriage of convenience than of true
minds. Notwithstanding the examples cited
above, much of the early adoption of
computation by biologists was for purposes
of laboratory information management,
with little sense that it would ever be good
for more than straightforward data acqui-
sition, reduction, and storage. By the same
token, theoretical computer scientists who
first encountered biology sometimes
seemed less interested in nature than in
citing motivating examples for string algo-
rithms or combinatoric problems with little
regard for their practical application.
Happily, as with the mutual stimulation
between biological taxonomy and compu-
tational classification methods, the subse-
quent history of bioinformatics took a
decidedly more syncretic turn, often as a
result of felicitous collaborations.
Even when individuals are willing,
institutions and policies can make or break
cross-disciplinary studies, in any field.
Carnap, the logical positivist, undertook
advanced training in both physics and
philosophy, and wrote a doctoral thesis at
the University of Jena on an axiomatiza-
tion of space-time. Both the physics and
philosophy departments found the work
interesting, but as a dissertation both
turned it away, each saying it was more
pertinent to the other field. A no doubt
exasperated Carnap rewrote it with an
undeniable philosophical cast and received
his degree from that department without
further ado in 1921 [75]. Many who
entered bioinformatics only a few decades
ago might empathize, but it hardly seems
an orphan discipline today, with major
funding initiatives, training programs, and
entire institutes devoted to it.
For reasons such as these, a retrospec-
tive view of the roots of bioinformatics is
likely to be a social history as much as
anything, tracing the interaction of scien-
tific disciplines down to the level of
university environments, scientific con-
claves, individual collaborations, and net-
works of interaction. Indeed, the impor-
tance of the sociology of science to its
progress is considered one of the main
intellectual legacies of Kuhn’s work, even
discounting his theories of scientific revo-
lution [3,9].
The tentativeness and doubt voiced by
pioneers like Levinthal and Simpson have
faded. The insights of Fisher, Turing, and
Shannon now underpin the standard
repertoire of bioinformatics tools. The
theoretical intuitions of Delbru ¨ck and
Gamow drive those tools, and the empir-
ical sensibilities of Sturtevant, McClintock,
and Nirenberg are embedded in them.
Whether this is revolution or evolution,
the story of how it came to pass—the roots
of bioinformatics—should make compel-
ling reading.
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